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STATEME.NT OF THE CASE
This appeal, simply stated, is to determine two
questions of law:
1. May a garnishment, after judgment, issue from
a small claims court ~
2. May a corporation, through its credit manager,
enter the small claims court, file an affidavit, testify,
and proceed without an attorney~
This action is in essence a declaratory proceeding
to guide litigants and courts in small claims actions as
to their rights and duties. There is confusion. (R. 55)
Some small claims courts in Utah issue garnishments;
some do not. Some small claims courts allow corporations to proceed without counsel; others require lawyers
to conduct the action. To dispel this confusion, this
appeal is prosecuted in order to achieve an authoritative determination.
This is not an appeal from a decision in a small
claims court. It is an ap·peal from a collateral attack,
brought by the plaintiff-respondent below, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, to enjoin the actions
of the Murray City Court acting as a small claims court.
In that action the interpretation of the statutes and
rules are questioned and constitutional issues are raised.
2
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STATEMENT OF T'HE FACTS
Appellant, Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, hereinafter called "Hi-Land", delivered milk to respondent,
Tuttle, who failed to pay for same. Hi-Land thereupon
brought an action in the Small 'Claims division of the
Murray City Court. (R. 26) The credit manager of
I-Ii-Land was Roy Harris, (R. 63, 67) who prepared the
Affidavit (ex. 1-P) stating Tuttle owed Hi-Land $40.48
for the merchandise.
Upon process being served, and at the appointed
date for trial, respondent Tuttle appeared and appellant Harris testified for Hi-Land. No attorney was
present. (R. 26) Both Tuttle and Harris were sworn,
and testified. No one argued.
" ... the Judge asked Mr. Tuttle if he owed
the bill and Mr. Tuttle says 'I do,' and the Judge
says, 'When are you going to pay it~' and Mr.
Tuttle said, ... he would like a little time to pay
the claim so the Judge asked him what he wanted
and Tuttle said that he would like two payments
to pay the claim." (R. 32-33)
The Small Claims judge entered a judgment as
prayed, allowing Tuttle to pay one-half on May 5, 1958
and the rest on June 5, 1958, said judgment being entered April 24, 1958. Exhibit 2-P is the docket showing
procedures. (R. 34)
"~lr.

Tuttle placed himself on the mercy of
the Court and agreed to pay one-half on the 5th
day of June." (R. 51)
3
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"He admitted that he owed the money and
that he would pay it.'' (R. 63)
When Tuttle didn't pay, on May 8, 1959, Houston,
Clerk of the Court, issued a garnishment, and the docket
shows it was returned on May 9. (Ex. 2P; R34) The
Garnishe's Answer, showed money due to Tuttle from
Kemp & Kelsey "for salary for payroll period ... "
Appellant Houston as clerk of the court issued and
served the garnishment and appellant Harris served the
garnishee execution (R. 29) by which Kemp & Kelsey
paid over to appellant Hi-Land $50.18. The Garnishee
Execution form as it was p-repared and served is among
the court's exhibits. It was on the basis of the garnishee
execution, based on the judgment, that the collection
was made. (R. 34) Thus the collection on the judgment
was completed by May 23, 1995 as shown on exhibit 2-P,
being the docket of the court.
On May 27, 1959 respondent Tuttle filed a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County against
appellants Hi-Land, Harris, and Houston, thereby undertaking collaterally to enjoin the Murray Small Claims
court from issuing garnishments, enjoining Harris from
taking action in that court e~cept through an attorney,
and for a return of the $50.18 recovered by Hi-Land,
among other things. (R. 1)
After answers, the pretrial order reflected important stipulations and the narrowing of the issues, (R. 16)
and trial was had resulting in Findings of Fact and ·Conclusions of Law (R. 87) and a Judgment. (R. 91) Three
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

essential elements are reflected in the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the court, as follows:
(1) Tuttle was given judgment for the return of
the $50.18 that had been recovered in the Small Claims
court earlier.
(2) The clerk of the Small Claims court was permanently enjoined from issuing a garnishment out of
that court.
Appellants Hi-Land and Harris were permanently enjoined from proceeding in the Small Claims
court: Hi-Land could not p·roceed without an attorney,
and Harris was held to be practicing law. (R. 91-92)
·(3

This appeal is prosecuted by all of the appellants,
not essentially because of any loss of the $50.18, as such,
but in order to have determined the following:
(a)

May a corporation use the Small Claims
court without the use of an attorney~

(b)

May a garnishment issue out of the
Small Claims court~
Appellants believe the trial court erred in its decision,
and will undertake to show the errors committed.
By the District Court finding that a corporation
must use counsel, and that the Small Claims court eannot issue a garnishment, collection procedures to the
people of the state of Utah are placed in great doubt.
Appellant Hi-Land has been deprived of its property,
to wit: the fruits of its collection against Tuttle. The
statutes have been misconstrued. Due process of law
has not been given Hi-Land. Hence this appeal.

5
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A CORPORATION MAY NOT PROCEED IN A SMALL CLAIMS COURT
EXCEPT THRO·UGH AN ATTORNEY, AND THAT A CORP~ORATE CREDIT MANAGER PRACTICES LAW WHEN HE
PURSUES A CASE THROUGH SMALL CLAIMS.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING A SMALL CLAIMS
COURT FROM ISSUING A GARNISHMENT.

POINT III
THE COURT ER.RED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO
E'8PONDENT FOR $50.18 AND COSTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A CORPORATION MAY NOT PRO·CEED IN A SMALL CLAIMS COURT
EXCEPT THRO·UGH AN ATTORNEY, AND THAT A CORP·ORATE CREDIT MANAGER PRACTICES LAW WHEN HE
PURSUES A CASE THROUGH SMALL CLAIMS.

The Findings of the court say:
"That a corporation of the State of Utah
may not app-ear in the courts of this state including the Small Claims Division of the Murray
'City Court except through an attorney authorized and licensed to p·ractice ... " (R. 90)
In this case it is clear that the Hi-Land corporation undertook to and did appear before the said Small
Claims court and got judgment under its credit man6
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ager, Harris. Let it be clear that only procedures before the Small Claims courts are involved in this ap·peal.
A real problem exists within the Small Claims courts
of Utah: It appears that such courts in Richfield,
Tooele, Moab, Ogden, and Murray, Utah, allow corporations to proceed in the manner followed by the Murray
Small Claims court as here stated. In the Small Claims
courts of Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah, corporations
are not allowed to proced without counsel, and they do
not issue garnishments. (R. 75) Hence the issues are
of much deep.er significance than the immediate litigants.
The Murray Small Calims court has from thirty to
forty cases per month. (R. 38)
Appellant Hi-Land files in its larger territory many
such cases each month, as high as thirty or forty. (R. 31,
67, 81) Many problems beset the corporation in making
small collections, to be later adverted to, where it is
uneconomic to proceed except through the credit manager of the corporation. The statutes of Utah creating
the Small Claims court gives the answer as to how to
proceed.
SMALL CLAIMS STATUTES
The enactment came to Utah in 1933 (Laws of Utah
1933, p. 28) as, in the early professorial language of
Felix Frankfurter: "one of the most notable achievements of recent years in procedural reform -the small
clailns courts ... " (37 Harv. L. Rev. 786) He stated
there that the new, informal procedures were matters

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"vital to the great masses, and vital to continued confidence in law. The germ of the innovation is set forth
in section 78-6-8 U·CA 1953 to the effect that "No formal
pleading, other than the said affidavit and notice shall
be necessary and the hearing and disposition of all such
actions may be informal, w~th the sole object of dispensing speedy justi~ce between the parties.'' The $50.00
limit was extended by the 1953 amendment to $100.00.
In the case at bar, we are struck with the fundamental proposition that a corporation cannot enter the
Small Claims court except through a licensed attorney.
Against this proposition, the matter of the issuance of
garnishments is secondary, to be treated under a subsequent head.
The principal issue here is whether or not a corporation is to be forced to enter this lowest of all courts
solely through a lawyer. The issue involves sober consideration to the bench and bar; there are implications
that involve the public relations of the entire legal profession. The decision of this court requires a careful
analysis of the public interest along with that of the
bar. Much harm may be done without a careful weighing of subtle values.
We do not find this court to have dealt with the
Small Claims issue. This is a case of first impression.
The Small Claims court is a "department" of the
"Justice Court" according to the organic act creating
it. 78-6-1 UCA 1953. The procedure for the action is
stated in the following section 78-6-2:

8
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"Actions may be maintained in the small
claims court whenever any person app·ears before
any justice of the peace or judge or clerk of a
city court and executes an affidavit setting forth
the nature and basis of the claim ... "
Thus we are confronted first with the question:
may a corporation enter the small claims court, through
a person, to wit, its credit manager, and execute the
required affidavti ~ At bar, appellant Harris executed
the affidavit (exhibit 1-P R. 52) There was confusion
in the Murray S'mall Claims court in the manner of
stating the name of the plaintiff as being appellant
I-Ii-Land, (R. 52, 53) but the p·retrial session ironed out
these difficulties by finding that in truth and fact, the
plaintiff was Hi-Land, to whom respondent Tuttle owed
the money for milk delivered. (R. 17, 53)
This court must examine the meaning of the words
"any person" as used in 78-6-2. To say that it does not
embrace a corporation would not make good law. Constantly throughout our law the word person and corporation are used interchangeably. "Person" is not a
\vord of art as here used, we must contend. In 48 C. J.
1038 it is said: the word person "is synonymous with
party, or party to the action, or suit.'' Certainly we
recognize a corporation as a party to an action.
The word "person" never appears again in the
organic small claims statute. Beginning with 78-6-3 it
is changed to the word "claimant," which word is
broader, and includes any person or entity having a
c1aim to be proven, and would obviously embrace a

9
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corporation. No one would argue tha.t a corporation
could not be sued as defendant in the small claims act.
There is nothing in the act being construed that precludes a corporation being a plaintiff. It would torture
the practice of our courts to say that a corporation may
not be plaintiff in a small claims action. No good would
be served, and it would complicate. To say that a corporation cannot sue in a small claims court would suggest that it could assign its claim to an individual, who
then would qualify as "any person" but this begs the
question. By 78-6-6 u~CA 1953 : "No claim shall be filed
or prosecuted in small claim court by an assignee of
such claim." Thus we come to grips with the fundamental question earlier stated. There is no good reason
that p·recludes a corporation from entering the small
claims court.
The basic theory of the small claims procedure is
clearly stated in 78-6-8:
"No formal pleading, other than the said affidavit and notice shall be necessary and the hearing and disposition of all such actions may he
informal, with the sole object of dispensing
speedy justice between the parties.''
To ere·ct the block of prohibiting corporations from
the small claims procedures is at once to inject formality, proscribed by the statute. The object is informality,
speedy justice. GINTHER v. SOUTH\\TEST WORI(OVER CO. 286 SW 2d 291 at 295 will aid in finding
that "ordinarily the term person includes a corporation," unless the legislative history, executive interpre-

10
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tation or other aids to construction, clearly show some
other intent.
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Art. XII,
sec. 4, secures rights and duties to corp,orations like
unto natural persons :
"The term 'corporation' as used in this article, shall be construed to include all associations
and joint-stock companies having any powers
or privileges of corporations not possessed by
individuals or partnerships, and all corporations
shall have the right to sue, and shall be subject
to be sued, in all courts, in like cases as natural
persons.''
The word "person" seems to have no generic definition in our stwtutes. It is defined in thirteen separate
sections shown at page 207 of the general index in vol.
10 UCA 1953. Under the Declaratory Judgments act,
at 78-33-13 the definition is quite typical:
"The word 'person' whenever used in this
chapter, shall be construed to mean any person,
partnership, joint-stock company, unincorporated
association or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever."
To the same effect is the definition under Commerce
and Trade, 13-2-20.
In PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. v. SMALL CLAIMS
COURT, 76 Cal App 2d adv. 465, 173 P.2d, 38 167 ALR
820 the District Court of Appeals of California laid down
the leading case in that jurisdiction, well annotated, and
"rorthy of being followed here. It asks the question:
11
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"Is a corporation a 'p·erson' within the meaning of this section~"
One of the primary issues in the case at bar also
includes that of whether an attorney may enter the
small claims court. This excellent California decision
shows that in that state the legislature prohibits attorneys from having anything to do with a small claims
case, and the issue there was whether this deprived a
litigant of due process. The Prudential case held:
"It must be apparent that when #117 g provides that only the plaintiff and defendant may
prosecute or defend such actions, and prohibits
any 'other person' from so appearing, it did not
intend to exclude, and by its language it does
not exclude, a proper representative of the corporation from appearing or defending such actions. The contended for interpretation would
disregard the provisions of the c·onstitution and
the Civil Code above quoted. Since corporations
can only appear through some natural person it
is obvious that the proper natural person may
appear to prosecute or defend such claims, and
that such a proper person is not an 'other person'
excluded by #117 g."
". . . Now who is a proper representative
that may lawfully appear in such cases~ Obviously the members of the board of directors and
other officers should be permitted to so appear
. . . In the present case the foreign corporation did not have an officer or member of its
board in California. It did have, however, a
manager of its life business, who was also its
statutory agent for service of all legal process
in this s~tate. He, quite clearly, can appear on
behalf of the corporation to defend the action.

12
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Just who else should be permitted to appear on
behalf of the corporation is not entirely clear
and could well be a subject for legislative action.
In the absence of such action it would appear
just and proper, that arvy regular employee not
directly employed as a lawyer, but whose duties
give him peculiar knowledge of the facts of such
cases, could app·e ar to represent the corporation, and this is so whether or not he is an attorney."
The California Court came head on with the policy
as to why attorneys were kept out of the small claims
court, in saying:
" ... As already pointed out, one of the main
purposes of the legislature as expressed in the
strutute is to restrict the proceeding to the actual
litigants and their witnesses and to prohibit
either side from using a representative advocate
such as an attorney. To allow one of the litigants
in such action to gain the advantage of legal representation in the manner here attempted would
contravene the clear purpose and intent of such
statute. That cannot be permitted."
So thus we have the court of California declaring that
corporations not only may enter the small claims courts,
by their regular employees, informed on the subject matter before the court, but in addition, that the corporation
cannot be represented by a licensed attorney The California statute is a great deal like the organic act in Utah,
and ours might even have been taken from that state.
The issue is far deeper than preserving to the legal
profession possible business for lawyers. If the small

13
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claims court system is to remain workable, then the
small litigant must be protected in his "personal" right
to claim and defend, informally. To force the corporation to use counsel would put the defendant to his caution to likewise get counsel, in which case, the real purpose of the small claims procedure is defeated for the
benefit of the legal profession.
Certainly the Bar of California is presumed to have
been alert to the statutory enactment that cut lawyers
off from small claims business, but that prohibition
passed that legislature, and was upheld by a unanimous
Court! It is for this splendid holding that we are willing
to say that the prime interest to be protected is the
public, and its confidence in the courts, and not the limited interest of attorneys to a field in which their function
is demonstrated as of doubtful value.
This excellent decision upheld the right of the corporation to use the small claims court, and deprived the
lawyer of entry therein. If that case is authority, it
disposes on rational grounds of the main part of this
appeal. The Utah statute does not in terms prohibit
attorneys. We do not argue here that attorneys should
be kept out of that court. \Ve simply sa~T that if a corporation does not wish to use counseL it certainly should
not be required to use a la,vyer. To engraft into the
statute a requirement that eorporations use an attorney
is at once to place the opposite party at a disadvantage,
and force resort to like counsel, in which ease, the entire
theory of the small claims court is defeated. The procedures ought to remain informal. The excellent dis-

14
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cussion in the Prudential case is appellant's best argument, without reproducing its many elements here.
The annotation following the Prudential case at 167
ALR 827 states the core purpose of small claims courts
as follows:
"The purpose of these courts is to provide a
speedy hearing at low cost to the litigants and
by virtue of the procedural innovations which
have, to a great degree, minimized the technicalities usually confront~ng ~and confounding the
parties involved in a legal dispute, the purpose
seems to have been accomplished. The unprecedented informality of the hearings has made
it possible for a court of this nature to adjudicate a maximum of claims in a minimum of time
and, as there has been no abandonment of the
rules of substantive law, with an apparent legal
sufficiency."
"In an effort to reach the ultimate in nontechnical proceedings some jurisdictions have by
legislative fiat or rule of court excluded attorneys
from these hearings. The neeessity or advisability of this step, limiting participating in the
adjudication of small claims to the immediate
parties, is an open question and this annotation
does not purport to give answers thereto."
The annotation note at page 829 states that in the
following states no attorney is allowed to appear:
California
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Minnesota
North Dakota

15
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In Michigan attorneys may not appear, but a personal representative may appear for the corporation.
By the consent of the court, attorneys may appear
in Oregon, Washington, Iowa. In the Municipal Court
of the District of Columbia, the pleadings inform defendant that he may come with or without counsel. Note
what the annotation says about Utah: (page 829)
"And the provisions of the Utah Code (title
20, c 52 #7) although not specifically barring attorney are said to be similar in purport to #117 g
of the California ·Code of Civil Procedure."

In the case at bar, let it be well remembered that
Harris, the person signing and filing the affidavit, and
appearing as a witness, and doing all that was done on
behalf of the corporate Hi-Land, was its credit manager.
(R. 63) There can be no doubt but that he was "a bona
fide employee," the person best informed, whose "duties
give him peculiar knowledge of the facts of such cases,"
to quote the criteria of the Prudential decision.
Appellant Harris "followed his instructions" meaning the clerk of the Murray Small Claims c·ourt, R. 52)
who referred to said credit manager to the proper form,
(R. 56) instructing how to fill it out. The garnishee
·execution was prepared by the clerk. (R. 57) Harris
testified under cross-examination :

"I am not a lawyer, Mr. Bell. I don't know
the technicalities of the law." (R. 66)
Harris followed the procedures of Cy Gallagher
who was credit manager ahead of himself, and who was

16
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on a semi-retired status as assistant credit manager.
(R. 68, 80)
As to the appellant Hi-Land's use and experience
with attorneys in small claims actions, the witness
Harris modestly stated :

"Q. Have you used attorneys in the collection
of Hi-Land Dairy bills generally~
A. No

Q. Why7
A. With all respect to the legal profession, we
have not found their service too satisfactory . . . It is not economically sound in all
cases. We have to locate the individual and
act on them immediately, otherwise we lose
them ... we found that there is a delay if
we use legal counsel . . . from the fact that
legal counsel does not know each individual
account as much as we do and this would result in a delay in this explanation and any
papers that had to be made out. (R. 69) ...
Well, the lawyer would have to make out
papers, file them and this results in a delay
in acting upon these affairs . . . important
... it is because these accounts in most cases
are with people who move around from job
to job, from residence to residence, and when
we find them we have to act now." (R. 69, 70)
The record shows that Warwick C. Lamoreaux, the
writer of this brief, has been for a long number of years
general counsel for appellant Hi-Land, and that the
witness had discussed procedures with the writer, and
Hi-Land was simply following the advice of its counsel.

17
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(R. 71, 79) The witness expressly stated he had never
"held himself out as a lawyer or practicing law." (R. 73)
The Utah statute aims at "dispensing speedy justice" (78-6-8), and in that connection, counsel for respondent summed up the question :

"Q. Mr. Harris, the primary things that you
have been able to accomplish in prosecuting
these matters is that it enabled the company
to move swiftly and act now, I believe that
is the primary benefit~
A. Yes." (R. 79)
Cy Galagher, the assistant credit manager at the
time of the litigation at bar, and with longer experience
with Hi-Land's problems, testified:
"We tried the Salt Lake Small Claims Court
with you (Lamoreaux) as attorney. It took half
a day to get a judgment and it doesn't pay ...
We have a lot of - not one or two but hundreds
of small claims . . . We file those in the Small
Claims Court that ·w. e can't get any other way
and they amount to ten, fifteen a month some.
. . . 1ess ... more. "
t rmes

"Q. Now, is it important to the Dairy that it have
access to the Small Claims Court~?
A.

Otherwise "~e just eouldn't get our money
. . . Because these are the type of people
that "'ill not pay unless you have the power
of the court behind you to make them pay.

Q.

N o"\\r is it easy for you to get counsel to help
in these s1nall clailn collections'

A.

It's been difficult because they are very
small. It is on a contingent basis and some-
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times if you have located them once, they
move again and you do not get them again.
It is a waste of time." (R. 81, 82)
While appellant Harris was testifying, the court
sustained an objection on the question of Hi-Land's
experience in sending a batch of small collections to
attorneys. Counsel for appellant made the following
proffer of proof:
"The witness, if he were allowed to testify
on this, would testify that it has been the experience of Hi-Land Dairy in sending batches of
collection matters to attorneys that the attorneys
will try and make collections. They will succeed
and make reports with respect to the larger
claims, but as to the smaller claims, after the
passage of several months, the claim goes back
to the Dairy and then time has passed .and it
involves great difficulty for the Association to
relocate and collect these small bills." (R. 74)
Before we return to the authorities to apply them
to the above undisputed fact situation before this and
the lower court, may we remind that app,ellant Hi-Land
could not possibly be alone in this problem of effecting
collection of numerous small amounts from ambulant
debtors who learn the art of keep·ing on the move. True
the witnesses were when they said that people move,
and that attorneys are not quick to follow leads. How
can a competent attorney give real attention to a collection of $10.00 or $30.00. The writer has gone through
this problem for twenty years with appellant. When
the proffer of proof was made by him he knows, with
every other attorney, that the better cases, higher in
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amount, are preferred, and that the small ones are returned "after the birds have flown," when it is too late
for the credit manager to do a quick, effective job of
obtaining "justice." There is no speedy justice available to plaintiffs in the record at bar. The corporation
that sells milk, the gas company, the grocer, anyone
having small amounts in great numbers to collect are at the mercy of busy lawyers, and the proof is before this court that the best means available is their
own credit department, not working on a contingency,
but with the sole interest of the claimant, and without
the necessity to bow to legal nicety. The small claims
court is the answer to that prayer. It does not take
anything real away from the busy, competent attorney.
It is too important to leave to the young lawyer fresh
out of law school, who has to learn by trial and error,
and during the learning, the corporate creditor gets lost.
The Utah statute does not need a narrow construction
that will deprive corporations of the remedy this modern procedural innovation offers. But let us turn again
to the authorities.
Massachusetts has ever been a leader in judicial
procedures, and its Supreme Court made important law
in the leading case of !Ic LAUGHLIN v. MUNICIPAL
COURT, 32 NE 2d, 266, 1951. There the plaintiff
brought an action in the s1nall claims court having
statutef' not different in any important particular from
lTtah. He appeared "~thout counsel. Defendant appeared 'vith counsel. When the attorney became prolix
the court took t11e case into its own hands, examined
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the witness, took active charge of the case and found
for plaintiff. Defendant appealed, and the high court
exhaustively treated the question of whether attorneys
had the right to conduct litigation in small claims courts
there. It held that the matter lay within the sound discretion of the court, and that the special procedures in
small claims were aimed to be "simple, informal, and
inexpensive." "The statute 'was intended to afford the
court full power to prevent its being used contrary to
the purposes of its enactment."
"This principle does not prevent the presiding judge in a case under the small claim procedure from taking active charge of the proceedings
and examining witnesses. Even under fonnal
procedure the judge 'ought to be always the
guiding spirit and the controlling mind at a
. l'" . ..
t na.
"The statute relating to small claims p·rocedure, however, contemplates if necessary more
active participation of the judge in the conduct
of the hearing than is usual under formal procedure. Obviously it was intended by the statute
to provide a form of hearing in which assistance
of parties by counsel would not be required,
since it was contemplated that in many, if not
most, cases the parties would not be so assisted.
Indeed, in the present case, the plaintiff was not
assisted by counsel . . . The defendant could not,
by being represented by counsel, change the essential nature of the hearing to which he had
assented ...
"Neither the statute nor the rule expressly
forbids examination of witnesses by counsel . . .
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"But we are of opinion that a judge under
the small claims procedure has a wide discretion
with respect to the extent of participation by
counsel in a hearing.''
May it he kept in mind that defendant-respondent
Tuttle appeared in the small claims court below, was
sworn, admitted he owed the bill, put himself on the
mercy of the court, asked for the privilege of paying
for the milk in two installments. (R. 32, 51). He did not
object to the procedure. It was only when an attorney
outside the case failed to intimidate the appellants,
(R. 29, 30, 59) that collateral attack was instituted in
an attempt to rob Hi-Land of the recovery for the milk
already consumed by the debtor who had not made timely
objection to the procedure! And note that the appeal
is not even designed to get the money back for the poor
defendant! The drawing of the findings are intended
to pay the attorney only for ti)ing to make slow, tedious,
and unsuccessful, the creditor's use of the small claims
court. (R. 90) ~fr. Tuttle took bankruptcy! (R. 59)
Shall this court make the procedure informal, inexpensive, speedy~ Or shall it require the old procedures of
formality, and that appellants found did not serve them
well~ The ~IcLaughlin rase is excellent. The court
ought to follo'v it, ren1e1nbering that lTtah procedure
al]o,vs the defendant to appeal, ''ith attorney fees to
thP prevailing part~~. 78-6-10 lTC_._.\_ 1953 This is one of
the rare places '""here nttorney fees are granted in the
ahsPnce of agree1nent. This court n1ight find relevance
in the a.'varding of appellate attorney fees as the price
of kePping attorJH?~~s out of the original proceeding.
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At any rate, the enumeration of states that absolutely
preclude attorneys from entering the small claims proceedings ought to caution this court from establishing
a rule that under the silent Utah statute attorneys must
appear for corp·o rations. It will work much mischief
if this court so affirms. If it reverses, procedural due
process will have been preserved. If it affirms, appellant will have been substantially deprived of due process; it will be required to use a slower, less effective,
and more expensive procedure that will not permit. it
to make its collections. Its debtors will escape payment
by moving ahead of slower procedures we ought not cast
attention upon.
The Massachusetts ease places great emphasis on
the discretion possessed by the trial judge. The record
at bar is devoid of any abuse of discretion by Judge
Lawrence E. Nelson who heard the case. The statutory
procedure was well followed. There could be not the
slightest criticism of the case down to the entry of
judgment. Only the technical questions of whether an
attorney should have been present (and one certainly
\vas not needed in this case) and garnishment procedures
are really under attack.
In the important case of SANDERSON v. NIEMANN, 110 P2d 1025 the Supreme ·Court of California
again stated of the small claims court :
"The chief characteristics of its proceedings
are that there are no attorneys, no pleadings
and no legal rules of evidence ; there are no
juries, and no formal findings are made on the
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issues presented. At the hearings the presentation of evidence may be sharply curtailed, and
the proceedings are often terminated in a short
space of time. The awards, although made in
accordance with substantive law, are often based
on the application of common sense; and the
spirit of compromise and conciliation attends the
proceedings. (cases)
The Sanderson case supra cites from 1 WIGMORE
EVIDENC·E, 3rd edition, 1940, section 4d, page 106
as follows:
"In small causes generally ... it would be a
defiance of common sense and a nullification
of the main purpose, to enforce the jury trial
rules of evidence ; for the parties are expected to
appear personally without professi~onal counsel,
and they cannot be expected to observe rules
which they do not know."
We are familiar with the doctrine that under ordinary circumstances a corporation cannot appear in
court except through an attorney. The principles are
laid down in PARADISE v. NOWLIN, 195 P2d 867 by
the California court for reference. In that case the court
found the rule stated; however it made express reference
to the exception to corporations entering small claims
courts, where statutory authority so allows, as in PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE, v. SMALL CLAIMS COURT,
supra.
We must admit that the Utah statute in terms does
not reach as far, nor is it as explicit, as the California
statute which prohibits attorneys in small claims courts.
The current edition of the California statute, with anno24
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tation, is at WE.ST'S ANNO. CALIF. c·ODES, Civil
Procedure, vol. 13, at page 166, under section 117g.
We believe there is more than ample authority in
the Utah statute for this court to construe the small
claims act as permitting a corporation to proceed propria persona, not through an attorney. As before stated,
"any person" may app·ear and execute the affidavit
under 78-6-2. For constitutional, due-process purposes,
a corporation has been shown, supra, to be entitled to
the privileges of natural persons, and be subject to the
same obligations. The corporation could only appear
through one of its knowledgeable agents such as its
credit manager. The statute turns in 78-6-3 to the
language of "claimant" which is impersonal and never
uses the word "person" again. In 78-6-4 "the justice
or judge or clerk shall inform the p.Zaintiff of the time
fixed and order him to appear at said time and to have
with him his books, papers and witnesses necessary to
prove his claim. When Harris came, how could he be
practicing law~ This could apply both to the p-ersonal
litigant and to the corporation. In 78-6-3 the court or
clerk may draft the affidavit that the "claimant" shall
sign, which shows that if the claimant is appearing by
a layman the judge or clerk may prepare the affidavit.
"The plaintiff and defendant shall have the right to
offer evidence in their behalf by witnesses appearing
at such hearing. The justice or court may give judgment and make such orders as to time of payments as
may, by him, be deemed to be right and just.'' So says
78-6-7, which affirms the informal procedure, shorn of
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technicalities. The procedural terms of "right and just"
do not fit the cloth cut by trained attorneys. Indeed, the
next section, quoted supra, is the "sole object to dispensing speedy justice between the parties" - clause,
and short-cuts the red-tape and technical procedures
that lawyers bring to the forum. The fee for filing is
cut to $1.50 by 78-6-14.
Certainly this court must wrestle with the basic
p·rocedural problems that have been faced by the California Legislature and many courts. It will be no disgrace to the legal profession for this court to find that
as used in the small claims act, and none other, that
"person" means corporation, and that a corporation
is not precluded from sending an informed p-erson to
that court to achieve speedy justice. Where as here,
the plaintiff-corporation seeks the small claims forum,
that is the end of its remedy unless the defendant files
a counterclaim; it cannot appeal! (78-6-10) The corporation gives up something important for its right to
enter the expeditious small claims forum; the defendant
does not. It would he an imposition on the other side
to require the corporation to bring counsel. It is a remarkable procedural advance affirmed by California
and Massachusetts, that this court ought to follow.
The trial court should be reversed in finding that
a corporation need have counsel, and that its credit
manger practiced law in signing the affidavit and testifying. He made no argument. It is clear the court
directed every stage of the proceeding, as the statute
allowed it, and the clerk under its direction, to do. After
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

all, justice was done. Tuttle owed the money; confessed
he did; he agreed with the court to pay, and then failed.
Speedy justice has been done; no injustice or bad, questionable procedure was pointed to except some of the
informality wiped out at pretrial.
We move now to garnishment.
II
THE COURT ERR.ED IN ENJOINING A SMALL CLAIMS
COURT FROM ISSUING A GAR.NISHMENT.

The trial court concluded that "The small claims
division of the Murray City Court does not have power
to issue a garnishment out of its small claims division ... "
(R. 90) In its judgment the same court was enjoined
from so doing. There is thus raised another major issue
that this court must resolve.
Be it remembered that whereas the small claims
courts in Tooele, Richfield, Moab, Ogden, and Murray
all allow garnishments to issue after judgment, the same
courts in Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah do not. (R.75)
Hence there is a serious conflict in the construction of
pertinent statutes and n1les, and appellants .argue that
to preclude the Murray small claims court in this proceeding from issuing a garnishment after judgment is
a denial of due process, and deprives app,ellants of equal
protection of the law.
The Murray court regularly issues garnishments
after judgment. (R. 30) The procedures were established by the judge of that court. (R. 46)
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The issue comes up under the conflict between 78-6-8
and the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64 D(b) (2).
The said statute concludes:

"No att~achment or garnishment shall vssue
from the small claims court, but execut~on may
issue in the manner prescribed by law upon the
payment of the fees allowed by law for such
services."
Thus, on its face, the statute says the small claims court
cannot issue a garnishment, but it also says that it may
issue an execution, and we argue that if an execution
may issue, this will include all of the elements of a
garnishment.
The real answer 1s not in a construction of the
above section, but in the repeal of that alleged prohibition under the following text of Rule 64D (b) (2):
"(2) AFTER JUDGMENT. After the entry
of judgment, the clerk of any court from which
execution thereon may issue shall, upon request
of the judgment creditor, issue a writ of garnishment and no affidavit or undertaking shall be
necessary as a condition therefor."
The Murray Small Cairns Court has construed this rule
as a repeal of the earlier statutory prohibition. (R. 30)
So we come head on to the conflict in the interpretation of the statute and the rule, and this court has jurisdiction to settle the controversy. Technically this is not
an appeal from a proceeding in a city or justice court,
for the immediate action was a collateral attack on the
small claims judgment. Under rule 72 (a) of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure, this court gets its jurisdiction
in any event because the validity and constitutionality
of the statute and n1le above in conflict must be construed by this court.
Every condition of Rule 64D (b) (2) has been met
in the case at bar: The garnishment was issued by the
court after judgment. The words of the rule above state
that ANY COURT may issue the garnishment. This
would embrace the small claims court; but the proviso
follovvs that "any court from which execution thereon
may be issued," and for this, let us go to the organic
act on small claims courts, and it expressly allows the
court to issue an execution. So that in terms, the rule
nullifies the former prohibition agains garnishment out
of the small claims court, and it clearly pennits any
court, which would include the small claims court, provided the court in question has power to issue an execution. Hence, the Judge and appellant Clerk of the Murray Small Claims Court thus took their authority to
issue the garnishments, after judgment, such as the one
at bar.
It is noted that Judge Jeppson in the pretrial order
held that in his opinion "the Small Claims Court can
legally issue garnishments." (R. 18)
Just how did the strange words get into the organic
small cairns act~ Eary in the history of these procedural
innovations there might have been a good reason to
preclude garnishments, but we find no rational thereon,
and we have looked. We would like to suggest, apart
29
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from the Utah rule on the subject, that any court that
has power to issue an execution, and does so, puts into
the power of the judgment creditor all of the powers
incident to garnishment, and more. In other words, may
it not be said that an execution embraces all of the
powers by which a judgment for money may be liquidated or realized~ Why does not an execution embrace
a garnishment~ At 4 Am. J ur. 552 at 553 it is said of
an attachment, ahead of judgment: "When the property of the debtor has thus been levied upon, it is conserved for eventual execut~on after the action shall
have pToceeded to judgment ... " On page 553 the same
authority says of garnishment:
"The term 'garnishment' as used today means
a proceeding or process whereby the property,
money, or credits of one p.erson, generally called
the 'debtor' and in the possession of, or owing
by, another, generally designated the 'garnishee'
are applied to the payment of the debt of the
debtor by means of process issuing against the
debtor and the garnishee."
Is property in the hands of a third party, belonging
to the defendant-judgment-debtor unavailable on execution~ We doubt that. The subject of execution is
elaborately treated in Rule 69 of the Utah Rules, and
all of these powers were available to appellant Hi-Land
to satisfy its judgment. Attention to the "Garnishee
Execution" by the court sho''Ts that the essential requisites of an execution 'vere present. This document refers
to the judgment; it states the court issuing the same
(although the small claims division thereof is not ex30
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pressly stated . . . an example of the informality of
that court) and that the judgment is for money, and the
a1nount thereof, to wit, $50.18. It directs a levy on the
unexempted personal property of the defendant, and in
effect this was done. True it did not require a sale to
convert the personal property into cash, and the cash
was taken on the garnishee execution to satisfy the debt.
We do not believe this court need construe all of
the tedious provisions of the execution rules unless it
wants to. The court ought to predicate its disposition
of this part of the case at bar by simply stating that
Rule 64 D (b) (2) rep·ealed the former p·rohibition, and
that thereunder, a small claims court is one of the courts
allowed, after judgment, to issue garnishments. To do
otherwise is to cut down the efficiency and exp~edition
of the small claims courts; make them technical, slowmoving, and ineffective; making it easy for judgment
debtors to escape the payment of their debts, and requiring technical nicety to take the place of informal,
speedy justice, from which there is ever a right of
appeal to defendants unjustly dealt with.
Certainly this court should not go back to the cumbersome procedures of the past and find that garnishment may not issue until after an execution is filed, as
in MILFORD BANK v. MURD·O·CK 65 P2d 627. The
new rule 64 D· (b) (2) has done away with this. There
should be no question but that after judgment, the judgment-creditor may apply at once for the garnishment
with no requirement of an affidavit or undertaking.
There should be no deviation from the essential pro-
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cedures followed in the case at bar, except for inforInalities that might be commented upon, in order to
establish a more orderly procedure. To require the
judgment creditor to take the route of execution would
be slow, cumbersome, and unprogressive. Garnishment
after judgment meets the test of due process to the
debtor; he is not injured at all thereby. The tools of
quick garnishment in small claims are necessary and
essential to collection of small amounts. To encumber
the procedure with technicalities, set aside by the new
rule, would rob the small claims court of the quick
remedy intended by the organic statute, amended by
this new rule.
There is no good and valid reason why Salt Lake
City and Provo small claims courts ought to cling to
old procedures. ·Courts, particularly of the kind under
scrutiny must find procedures that will increase the
respect of the public therefor, not bog them down with
technicalities that make informal function impossible.
The result in the Murray court hurt no one. The man
who bought the milk ought to pay for it; the injured
seller, acting through its credit manager, ought to have
a clear and quick way of getting at any or all of the
proper assets of the debtor after judgment, without
obstruction. We believe the courts, debtors, and the
public will lose nothing of real value by adhering to
the practice of the Murray court. Indeed, if all small
claims courts are given direction in this decision, collections of small claims will he facilitated, and that is
32
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the business of the bench and bar m this declaratory
proceeding.
While we do not predicate our argument on the
cumbersome procedures of execution, we ask the court
to note Rule 69 (i) which authorizes a garnishee to pay
the judgment creditor. And let it also be born in mind,
if the question comes up., that there is no issue on appellant taking exempt property. Respondent has never
raised that issue; and it is too late now.
Attention is called to Rule 81 (a) :
"These rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings except insofar as such rules
are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where
a statute provides for procedure by reference
to any part of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules."
We submit that the small claims statute, and 78-6-8
in particular, refers to the former Code of Civil Procedure in respect to executions, and thereby, the above
rule makes the procedural, statutory prohibition against
garnishment inop·erative. It has clearly been amended
by Rule 64 D (b) (2).
Rule 81 (c) makes the rules apply to city and justice courts, and thereby they expressly apply to the
small claims courts. The rule under crucial examination
is clearly applicable, and expressly addresses itself to
"all courts," which includes small claims courts that
have powers of execution.
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The injunction issued by the District Court against
the Murray Small Claims Court in the issuance of garnishments after judgment, must be declared to be error,
and reversed.
III
THE COU·RT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO
RESPONDENT FOR $50.18 AND COSTS.

If this court finds that small claims courts may be
entered by corporations, and that their bona fide representatives do not practice law in making the affidavit
and testifying, and seeking to collect small amounts;
and in addition, that garnishments may issue under the
rules of this court as an amendment to the small claims
act, then it follows that the judgment given in the Murray Small Claims court to appellant Hi-Land ought to
stand as collected.
We deem no special argument need be made hereon.

We respectfully request this court to reverse the
trial court and find a procedure that will allow corporations to do small collections without resort to technicalities, counsel, and with the right to immediate garnishment after judgment.
Respectfully,
WARWICK C. LAJ\JOREAUX,
ROBERT REES DANSIE,
Attorneys for Appellants
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